

## Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /016 R

DRAFTED BY C:HSNENFELDT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 154775 TOSEC 050055

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGE: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: MY SPEECH TO THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SONNENFELDT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REMARKS I HAVE PREPARED FOR USE AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN NEWPORT ON JULY 1:

2. "THE MEANING OF 'DETENTE'. ON MAY 12 OF THIS YEAR, TWO U.S. WARSHIPS, THE GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE 'LEAHY' AND THE DESTROYER 'TATTNAL' SAILED INTO LENINGRAD HARBOR. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC, TWO SOVIET DESTROYERS WERE TYING UP AT BOSTON. BANDS PLAYED, SALUTES RESOUNDED, GLASSES CLINKED, ACCOMPANIED BY EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE WAR, THE UNITED STATES' AND SOVIET NAVIES WERE EXCHANGING VISITS.

3. "THE POLITICAL PROCESS REFLECTED BY THESE VISITS HAS COME TO BE REPRESENTED BY A WORD -- DETENTE -- WHICH UNTIL RECENTLY REMAINED AN OBSCURE TERM CONFINED TO THE ACADEMIC LEXICON. THIS PHRASE IS STILL IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD. UNFORTUNATELY, DETENTE LENDS ITSELF TO QUITE MISLEADING AND VASTLY OVER-SIMPLIFIED INTERPRETATIONS. WHILE IT WOULD PERHAPS BE AN EXAGGERATION TO SAY DETENTE HAS ENTERED INTO UNCLASSIFIED

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HOUSEHOLD USAGE, IT HAS BECOME A SYMBOL OF SOME CONSIDERABLE PASSION AND CONTROVERSY.

3. "LITERALLY, DETENTE MEANS SIMPLY THE RELAXATION OF

TENSION. THIS DEFINITION, HOWEVER, IS FAR TOO SIMPLE AND STATIC TO DESCRIBE THE COMPLEX SET OF RELATIONSHIPS THAT ARE EVOLVING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

4. "RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE, OF COURSE, BEEN A CENTRAL PROBLEM FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR SOME THIRTY YEARS. MUCH HAS CHANGED IN BOTH THE CHARACTER OF THESE RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THESE RELATIONS OCCUR. BUT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE BOUND TO BE AT THE CORE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS. FOR THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS THE SINGLE MOST POWERFUL STATE IN THE WORLD BESIDES OURSELVES; ITS POWER CONTINUES TO GROW AND ITS INTERESTS TO EXPAND. INDEED, IT CAN BE SAID THAT IN THE BROAD SWEEP OF HISTORY, SOVIET RUSSIA IS ONLY JUST BEGINNING ITS TRULY 'IMPERIAL' PHASE: ITS MILITARY FORCES HAVE ACQUIRED INTERCONTINENTAL REACH ONLY FAIRLY RECENTLY; ITS CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN REMOTE AREAS IS OF RELATIVELY RECENT STANDING; IT IS ONLY JUST ACQUIRING THE HABIT OF DEFINING ITS INTERESTS ON A GLOBAL RATHER THAN A SOLELY CONTINENTAL BASIS. FOR US, THEREFORE, THE PROBLEM IS THAT OF BUILDING VIABLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH AN EMERGING WORLD POWER.

5. "AS IN MUCH OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED, DEMOCRATIC WORLD, THE VALUES AND PRIORITIES OF AMERICA'S SOCIETY HAVE UNDERGONE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN RECENT YEARS. DOMESTIC CONCERNS HAVE BECOME AN INCREASING PRE-OCCUPATION. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO LOOK INWARD. YET WE WILL NOT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ESCAPE THE COMPLEX CHALLENGE OF EXISTING SIDE BY SIDE ON A SHRINKING GLOBE WITH A SOVIET UNION THAT CONTINUES TO GROW IN POWER, WEIGHT AND REACH. IT MUST BE A MAJOR PURPOSE OF OUR DIPLOMACY AND OF OUR SECURITY POLICIES AS A WHOLE TO ENSURE THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES OUR OWN INTERESTS AND VALUES ARE SAFEGUARDED, THAT POWER IS USED WITH RESTRAINT AND INFLUENCE

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WIELDED RESPONSIBLY. ESSENTIALLY, THAT IS WHAT DETENTE IS ALL ABOUT. THAT IS WHY WE SHOULD THINK OF DETENTE AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS OF ENORMOUS COMPLEXITY RATHER THAN AS A SIMPLE STATE OF RELAXATION. AND THAT IS WHY WE MUST PERSIST IN THE BASIC POLICIES WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.

6. "DESPITE SOME OF THE RHETORIC THAT HAS OCCASIONALLY OBSCURED THEM, THE POLICIES ASSOCIATED WITH DETENTE HAVE NOT RESTED ON ILLUSIONS. WE REALIZE FULL WELL THAT SOVIET VALUES AND OBJECTIVES ARE IN MANY WAYS INIMICAL TO OUR OWN, AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. WE KNOW THAT OUR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES ON WHICH THEY

REST ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT; THAT HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE HAVE SHAPED OUR RESPECTIVE OUTLOOKS IN OFTEN DIVERGENT WAYS. WE ASSUME THAT MOSCOW WILL NOT REFRAIN FROM SEEKING TOTURN INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO ITS ADVANTAGE, ESPECIALLY WHERE IT ENCOUNTERS THE KIND OF WEAKNESS THAT MAKES THE RISKS OF DOING SO MINIMAL.

7. "YET WE ALSO HAVE BEEN CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT SOVIET POWER HAS DEVELOPED UNEVENLY, THAT THERE WERE NEEDS, SHORTCOMINGS AND DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING SOVIET DECISION-MAKERS, AND THAT THERE WERE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA NOT ONLY OPENINGS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET GAIN BUT ALSO SUBSTANTIAL RESISTANCE TO EXCESSIVE SOVIET INFLUENCE. MOREOVER, IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND THE SO-CALLED 'SOCIALIST CAMP' ARE FAR FROM MONOLITHIC AND THAT NEITHER THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM NOR THE IDEOLOGY OF MARXISM-LENINISM TODAY EXERCISE THE KIND OF MAGNETISM AND APPEAL THAT ITS ADVOCATES HAD HOPED FOR AND ITS OPPONENTS FEARED.

8. "THUS, WHEN AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS DECADE SIGNS APPEARED THAT THE LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH OURSELVES AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, IT SEEMED DESIRABLE TO PURSUE THE OPENINGS PRESENTED AND TO UNDERTAKE A HARD-HEADED AND MULTI-FACETED EFFORT TO TEMPER ANTAGONISM WITH RESTRAINT, CONFRONTATION WITH NEGOTIATION AND THE IMPULSES OF POWER WITH THE INCENTIVES OF RESPONSIBILITY.  
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9. "THE COURSE ON WHICH WE EMBARKED REQUIRED TOUGHNESS OF MIND AND STEADFASTNESS OF PURPOSE. IT DEMANDS A SOBER VIEW NOT ONLY OF SOVIET STRENGTHS BUT OF OUR OWN. IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO EVOLVE A BALANCE OF INCENTIVES FOR POSITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PENALTIES FOR BELLIGERENCE; THE OBJECTIVE IS TO INSTILL IN THE MINDS OF OUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES AN APPRECIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION RATHER THAN CONFLICT, AND THUS LESSEN THE THREAT OF WAR.

10. "THUS, DETENTE IN PRACTICE HAS BEEN AN ACTIVE POLICY, CONDUCTED OVER A BROAD FRONT OF ISSUES, AND BASED ON HARD REALITIES. ITS ULTIMATE GOAL IS NOT A SIMPLE, TEMPORARY RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION BUT THE CREATION OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.

11. "THE PREREQUISITE FOR THE PURSUIT OF THIS GOAL IS A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE. ADEQUATE MILITARY FORCES AND THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS TO SUSTAIN THEM ARE BY NO MEANS INCOMPATIBLE WITH DETENTE; THEY ARE A BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR ITS SUCCESSFUL PURSUIT. INTERESTS WILL BE RESPECTED ONLY IF IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY CAN BE DEFENDED. RESTRAINT WILL PREVAIL ONLY IF ITS ABSENCE IS KNOWN TO CARRY HEAVY

RISKS.

12. "THE SECOND PREREQUISITE FOR A SUCCESSFUL PURSUIT OF DETENTE IS THE STRENGTH AND VIGOR OF OUR ALLIANCES. PROGRESS TOWARD A SAFER AND MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SET OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES DOES NOT OBVIATE THE NEED FOR THE MUTUAL COMMITMENTS AND COOPERATIVE VENTURES OF ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS. FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS AND VALUES WE SHARE WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES ARE NO LESS IMPORTANT TO OUR WELL-BEING IN CONDITIONS OF DETENTE THAN THEY WERE IN PERIODS OF ACUTE AND MULTIPLE CRISES.

13. "BASED ON THESE PREREQUISITES, WE ARE PURSUING OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUILDING A MORE STABLE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM THAT EMBRACES THE CONTINUATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH TRADITIONAL ALLIES AND THE EVOLUTION OF NEW RELATIONS WITH OUR ADVERSARIES. BROADLY SPEAKING, WE ARE PROCEEDING UNCLASSIFIED

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ALONG THREE COURSES: FIRST, BY PROGRESS IN LIMITING ARMS; SECOND, BY DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR RESTRAINED INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT, AND, THIRD, BY BUILDING MORE NORMAL CONTACTS AND HABITS OF COOPERATION IN OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT.

14. "THE MOST SENSITIVE, COMPLEX AND AMBITIOUS ENDEAVOR TOWARD ARMS CONTROL HAS BEEN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE

SOVIET UNION ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS. THIS ISSUE PRESENTS AN ESSENTIAL TEST -- WHETHER THE WORLD'S TWO NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS WILL BE ABLE TO TRANSLATE THEIR COMMON INTEREST IN SELF-PRESERVATION INTO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL LESSEN THE UNCERTAINTIES OF OPEN-ENDED COMPETITION AND THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. A MILESTONE WAS REACHED IN MAY 1972 WHEN BOTH COUNTRIES AGREED TO FOREGO TERRITORIAL DEFENSE AGAINST OFFENSIVE MISSILES. WHILE FAR FROM DISPOSING OF ALL THE DANGERS IN THE US-SOVIET STRATEGIC MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, THIS TREATY DID CONFRONT BOTH SIDES WITH THE STARK FACT THAT THEIR PEOPLES ARE TO REMAIN UTTERLY VULNERABLE TO MISSILE ATTACK. FOR THE DEFENSIVE MINDED RUSSIANS IT WAS NOT AN INSIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL STEP THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF GREATER STABILITY, THIS VULNERABILITY WAS TO BE SANCTIONED BY A TREATY WITH ITS PRINCIPAL COMPETITOR. THE SOVIETS ALSO COMMITTED THEMSELVES AT THIS TIME TO FREEZE THE NUMERICAL SIZE OF THEIR OFFENSIVE MISSILE PROGRAMS AND AGREED TO AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO DISMANTLE A NUMBER OF THEIR OLDER MISSILES IF THEY ACQUIRED THE PERMITTED NUMBER OF SEA-BASED MISSILES.

15. "GIVEN THE DYNAMISM OF SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AND THE ABSENCE, AT THE TIME, OF ANY NEW PROGRAMS OF OUR

OWN, THIS FIVE-YEAR INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC FORCE CEILINGS WAS A CONSIDERABLE FIRST ACCOMPLISHMENT.

16. "NOW WE ARE ENGAGED IN THE SECOND STEP OF THE SALT PROCESS -- WORKING OUT A TREATY TO PUT EQUAL CEILINGS ON OFFENSIVE MISSILES AND, MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, ON THEIR MOST POTENT QUALITATIVE ASPECT -- MIRVED WARHEADS. THERE IS REASON TO HOPE THAT THESE TALKS WILL SUCCEED, AND THAT FOR THE NEXT TEN YEARS, THE INCALCULABILITY OF THE  
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RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC FORCE PROGRAMS WILL BE REDUCED.

17. "THE NEXT, EVEN TOUGHER STEP WILL BE TO SEEK ACTUAL AGREED FORCE REDUCTIONS, BUT TO DO SO WITHOUT ADDING INSTABILITY.

18. "SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULATION OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION, WE ARE NEGOTIATING ON FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. OUR OBJECTIVE HERE, AS IN SALT, IS TO STRENGTHEN MILITARY STABILITY AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY. IN CONTRAST TO SALT, HOWEVER, MBFR IS A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION IN WHICH OUR ALLIES ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED. OTHER NEGOTIATIONS DEAL WITH LIMITATIONS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE, ON ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE TECHNIQUES AND ON NUCLEAR TESTS, INCLUDING EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. INDEED, THERE HAS NOT AT ANY PREVIOUS TIME BEEN A MORE INTENSE AND VARIED DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON MATTERS OF ARMS CONTROL.

19. "IN ADDITION TO SEEKING AGREEMENTS THAT PLACE LIMITS ON MILITARY PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES, WE HAVE ENGAGED THE SOVIET UNION IN EFFORTS TO DEFINE CERTAIN BROAD STANDARDS OF CONDUCT WHICH IF ADHERED TO CAN SERVE TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF COMPETITION. IN THE NATURE OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, SUCH UNDERSTANDINGS ARE NOT NECESSARILY SELF-ENFORCING, NOR CAN THEY BE ALTOGETHER FREE OF AMBIGUITY AND ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION. THEY DO NEVERTHELESS SET YARDSTICKS BY WHICH CONDUCT CAN BE MEASURED AND THEY SET FORTH THE ELEMENTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER FAR MORE CONSONANT WITH OUR VALUES THAN THE RATHER STERILE AND IDEOLOGICALLY COLORED PRECEPTS THAT CAME TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SLOGAN OF 'PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE' IN EARLIER PHASES OF THE POST-WAR ERA. THUS, THE AGREED PRINCIPLES SIGNED AT THE 1972 SUMMIT ACCENTUATED THE CONCEPTS OF RESTRAINT AND RESPECT FOR INTERESTS.

20. "THE 1973 AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE THAT NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE RULED OUT ONLY IF ALL FORMS OF MILITARY AGGRESSION ARE PRECLUDED. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE SINGLED OUT FOR PROHIBITION AS LONG AS

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OTHER FORMS OF MILITARY ATTACK ARE NOT EXCLUDED. OF COURSE, THE ULTIMATE MEANS OF PREVENTING WARFARE IN A WORLD IN WHICH ARMS LEVELS REMAIN HIGH AND INTERESTS ARE IN CONFLICT IS AN ADEQUATE MILITARY DETERRENT CAPACITY. BUT THAT DOES NOT DIMINISH THE VALUE OF DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, INCLUDING THE PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION IN THE EVENT OF CRISES.

21. "THIS PROCESS HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT SOME PRACTICAL UTILITY, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AGREED UPON IN 1972 AND 1973 SHOULD CERTAINLY BE APPLICABLE. AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, IT HAS SO FAR PROVED EASIER TO APPLY THE STANDARDS OF RESTRAINT BILATERALLY AND TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE THAN TO CRISES AND DIFFICULTIES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. BUT COMPETITION AND HOSTILITY CANNOT LONG BE COMPARTMENTED, ANYMORE THAN CAN COOPERATION. DETENTE RELATIONSHIPS MUST EVOLVE ACROSS THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL CRISES ISSUES, OR THEY WILL BE HARD TO SUSTAIN.

22. "ARMS CONTROL, STANDARDS FOR CONDUCT, AND CONSULTATION PROCEDURES ARE ALL ESSENTIALLY EFFORTS TO MODERATE COMPETITION, REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF CRISES AND TO MANAGE THEM WHEN THEY OCCUR. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, THERE ARE THE MORE POSITIVE KINDS OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS AND TO REDUCE THE GULF BETWEEN PEOPLES. THIS OR THAT INDIVIDUAL COOPERATIVE PROJECT MAY BE RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT, BUT CUMULATIVELY AND OVER TIME, A WHOLE NETWORK OF AGREEMENTS, PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS CAN PRODUCE A VESTED INTEREST IN MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIPS. THIS IS BECAUSE BOTH SIDES DERIVE CONCRETE BENEFITS FROM SUCH UNDERTAKINGS. THEY SHOULD ACQUIRE A MOUNTING INTEREST IN NOT HAVING THEM PLACED IN JEOPARDY BY RENEWED DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS. FOR IT IS EVIDENT THAT BROAD COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS IN CULTURE, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY -- WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS -- HEALTH, SPACE, TRADE, ETC., CAN HARDLY BE MAINTAINED IN A SITUATION OF PERSISTENT CONFRONTATION AND CRISIS.

23. "WHILE THESE POLICIES CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVELY PURSUED  
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AND IMPLEMENTED THROUGH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) IS A MULTILATERAL EFFORT TO ESTABLISH GENERAL AND SPECIFIC GUIDELINES FOR A MORE STABLE AND COOPERATIVE ORDER IN EUROPE. IF THE REMAINING ISSUES CAN BE SATISFACTORILY

RESOLVED, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE THIS CONFERENCE, IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN COOPERATING CLOSELY WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, LATER THIS SUMMER. THE PROVISIONS LABORIOUSLY WORKED OUT BY MORE THAN 30 EASTERN, WESTERN AND NEUTRAL NATIONS IN SUCH AREAS AS HUMAN CONTACTS, INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND A MULTIPLICITY OF OTHERS, WILL THEN BE TESTED IN PRACTICE.

24. "I JUST REFERRED TO TRADE IN PASSING. THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH HAS INSPIRED SPECIAL CONTROVERSY IN RECENT MONTHS. HISTORICALLY, COMMERCIAL LINKS BETWEEN NATIONS HAVE OFTEN PROCEEDED APACE WITH LITTLE REGARD TO THEIR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS. IN DEALING WITH AUTHORITARIAN, STATE-TRADING COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, SOME CONTROL IS OBVIOUSLY NEEDED. TO ALLOW TRADE SIMPLY TO FOLLOW THE WHIMS OF THE MARKET PLACE ON OUR SIDE, WHILE IT IS RIGIDLY CONTROLLED ON THE SOVIET SIDE, WOULD BE FOLLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE USE OF TRADE AS A POLITICAL BARGAINING INSTRUMENT. THIS WAS GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED LAST JANUARY WHEN THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS OF THE TRADE ACT AS A BASIS FOR PUTTING OUR TRADE AGREEMENT INTO EFFECT.

25. "IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD PUT THE TRADE ISSUE INTO PERSPECTIVE. ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE NOT, AND SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A ONE-WAY FLOW OF BENEFITS TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1972 WAS DESIGNED TO PUT TRADE ON AN ORDERLY BASIS; IT CONTAINED NUMEROUS PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS INTENDED TO GIVE PROTECTION TO AMERICAN FIRMS OPERATING IN THE USSR AND TO PRECLUDE ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR OWN ECONOMY OF IMPORTS FROM THE USSR.

26. "REGRETTABLY, THESE ADVANTAGES, WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MUTUAL EXTENSION OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY TARIFF TREATMENT, ARE NOW SUSPENDED, UNCLASSIFIED

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ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS IMPLEMENT SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABORTED TRADE AGREEMENT DE FACTO. THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO USE THE EX-IM BANK AND ITS FACILITIES IN TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION DEPRIVES US OF AN INSTRUMENTALITY FOR CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF CREDITS TO THE USSR; MOREOVER, WE HAVE LITTLE BASIS FOR DEVELOPING SOME UNDERSTANDING ON CREDIT POLICIES WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, MANY OF WHOM HAVE EXTENSIVE AND GENEROUS CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE USSR.

27. "IN SHORT, THE EFFECT OF OUR PRESENT TRADE LEGISLATION HAS BEEN TO DENY OUR GOVERNMENT THE MEANS OF PURSUING A COHERENT STRATEGY IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND OF INTEGRATING TRADE RELATIONS INTO OUR

OVER-ALL POLICIES. IN ADDITION, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE PURPOSES OF THE TRADE ACT'S PROVISIONS ON EAST-WEST TRADE ARE GOING UNFULFILLED AS EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR HAS SHARPLY DECLINED. OUR BUSINESS COMMUNITY HAS BEEN PLACED AT A SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE COMPARED TO THE OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN FIRMS. THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO SEEK REMEDIAL LEGISLATION SO THAT TRADE WITH THE USSR CAN PROCEED IN AN ORDERLY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS FASHION AND CAN PLAY ITS PROPER ROLE IN A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION.

28. THE DIPLOMATIC GAME IS MORE LIKE CHESS THAN POKER. ALL THE PIECES ON THE BOARD HAVE TO BE KEPT IN MIND, AS DOES THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OTHER PLAYER. THE OPPONENT'S HAND IS RARELY CONCEALED, THOUGH HIS INTENTIONS MAY BE UNCERTAIN. SUCCESS DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE LUCK OF THE DRAW, AND BLUFF IS RISKY.

29. "IN ONE IMPORTANT RESPECT, HOWEVER, DIPLOMACY IS LIKE NEITHER CHESS NOR POKER. IT IS NOT NECESSARILY A ZERO SUM GAME. BOTH SIDES CAN WIN, OR BOTH SIDES CAN LOSE. FURTHER, WHEN NUCLEAR WAR MAY BE THE ULTIMATE MOVE, NEITHER SIDE CAN AFFORD TO PUSH THE GAME TO A CONCLUSION.

30. "GIVEN THIS REALITY, OUR OVER-ALL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH ANY SUCH ULTIMATE ISSUES WILL NOT ARISE. THE MEANS TO THIS END IS, OVER TIME, TO UNCLASSIFIED

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CREATE A PATTERN OF RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT AND AN INTER-LOCKING FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ENFORCED BY INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR AND DISINCENTIVES TO DISCOURAGE CONFRONTATION. ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE HAD ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS ON THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT -- A SUBJECT WHICH I AM SURE IS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO YOU. IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH SIDES THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS HELPED REDUCE DANGEROUS ENCOUNTERS ON THE HIGH SEAS WHICH ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO WERE CREATING SERIOUS RISKS. THIS MAY BE A MODEST AND AS YET IMPERFECT ACCOMPLISHMENT, BUT IT ILLUSTRATES A BASIC POINT. IT HAS OCCURRED NOT AS A RESULT OF THE BENEVOLENCE EITHER OF OURSELVES OR OF OUR ADVERSARIES, BUT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A SOBER PURSUIT OF INTERESTS. THAT IS AND MUST BE OUR APPROACH.

31. "IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS A SERIES OF DRAMATIC EVENTS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE UTILITY OF FLEXIBLE MILITARY STRENGTH, IN AN ERA OF DETENTE. ON MAY 12, AFTER OTHER EFFORTS WERE TO NO AVAIL, US MARINE AND NAVAL FORCES PARTICIPATED IN RESCUING THE US MERCHANT SHIP 'MAYAGUEZ' AND ITS CREW WHILE DEFENDING THE AGE OLD PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS. IT WAS ON THIS VERY SAME DAY THAT OUR WARSHIPS



STEAMED INTO LENINGRAD HARBOR FOR THE FIRST SUCH VISIT IN THREE DECADES. FINALLY, ON JUNE 5, THE FLAGSHIP OF THE SIXTH FLEET, THE CRUISER 'LITTLE ROCK,' WAS GIVEN A PLACE OF HONOR IN THE FLOTILLA WHICH OPENED THE SUEZ CANAL.

32. "EACH OF THESE EVENTS ILLUSTRATES, IN ITS OWN WAY, THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF SEA POWER IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. THEY ALSO DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUING PLACE OF THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY.

33. "I CAN ASSURE YOU, WHO LEAVE HERE TODAY TO TAKE COMMAND OF SHIPS, SQUADRONS, AND SHORE STATIONS, AND TO SERVE ON KEY STAFFS AT VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS OR IN WASHINGTON, THAT FOR YOU 'DETENTE' WILL NOT MEAN RELAXATION BUT CHALLENGING WORK. IN THIS COMPLEX AGE THE WELFARE OF OUR NATION DEPENDS, AS IT NEVER HAS BEFORE, UNCLASSIFIED

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ON THE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS, JUDGMENT, ALERTNESS, DISCRETION, AND, WHEN NECESSARY, THE VALOR OF OUR MILITARY LEADERS. THE CHALLENGES WHICH YOU FACE IN THE YEARS TO COME WILL HOPEFULLY BE THOSE OF PEACE. I THINK YOU CAN REST ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE CHALLENGES WILL BE NO LESS DAUNTING THAN THOSE OF WAR, AND NO LESS REWARDING FOR EACH OF YOU PROFESSIONALLY." INGERSOLL

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TOSEC  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE154775  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** C:HSonnenfeldt  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750227-0214  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197507103/baaaaobw.tel  
**Line Count:** 464  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** MartinML  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 13 FEB 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <13 FEB 2003 by ThomasVJ>; APPROVED <03 MAR 2004 by MartinML>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006